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ABSTRACT
The T-45, a military jet trainer aircraft for the Navy, recently experienced two cases of an
uncommanded main landing gear extension during high airspeed and high g conditions.
These events resulted in an investigation to understand the cause. The initial response to
the mishaps was to limit the fleet to lower airspeeds since both mishaps occurred at high
speeds.

This limitation was not extensively restrictive for fleet operations; however, it

was limiting for acceptance flights and functional check flights of aircraft.

During the

investigations, two different mechanical problems were discovered in the main landing
gear uplock mechanism. This mechanism is designed to physically hold the landing gear
in the “up” position. The proposed fixes for the identified problems resulted in a new
smaller diameter spring pin to remove mechanical interference between the wing
structure and the spring pin. The second change was a new material bushing that was
designed to remove the friction in the system and allow the latch that holds the uplock in
place to move freely. During the investigation, it became evident that there was a lack of
knowledge about the landing gear environment among the T-45 community. As a result
of this lack of knowledge, the flight test group was asked to conduct a flight test and
gather the data needed to ensure that the proposed fixes would completely solve the
causal factors of the mishap.

The flight clearance for the proposed flight test required the incorporation of Naval
Aviation Depot (NADEP) engineer’s proposed corrections into the system. This mandate
was met with confusion from the flight test community, due to the desire to investigate
the initial configuration to determine the cause of the original mishap.
ii

The flight test

was performed with the corrections and no problems were identified, leaving a question
as to the original casual factors.

This course of events exemplifies a lack of

communication between the flight clearance authority and the flight test community. An
attempt was made to reverse some of the initial changes and return the uplock to the
original state. It was finally determined that structural interference did create motion in
the system, which could possibly result in the landing gear extension that had occurred.
The flight test did not result in a full understanding of the original system; however, the
test indicated that the new proposed system had no motion that would indicate that a
future problem would exist. The new procedures and hardware were released to the fleet
allowing the fleet to return to a full flight envelope.

This thesis investigates the problem of the uplock mechanism and the flight test that was
designed and executed to assist in correcting these problems. It also investigates how
organizational structure influenced this engineering investigation and affected the
outcome of this test.

The flight test community, flight clearance community, maintenance engineering and
program offices need to balance the risk inherent to flight test, and the level of
understanding of the system under test against the potential knowledge gained by flight
testing to determine a path of execution. There are times that flight test results may not
enable engineers to understand the causal factors to a problem or define a correction to
the problem. In this case, it is the author’s opinion that there may have been information
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lost due to the process used to perform the test. However, the proposed fixes did solve
the majority of the fleet’s problems.
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PREFACE
A portion of the information contained within this thesis was obtained during a Naval Air
System Command sponsored program.

The research, results and conclusions and

recommendations presented are the opinion of the author and should not be constructed
as an official position of the United States Department of Defense, the United States
Navy, the Naval Air Systems Command or the T-45 program office.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
AIRCRAFT
The T-45C aircraft is a two-place, tandem, fully carrier capable, jet trainer for the USN.
A detailed description of the test aircraft is available in the T-45C Naval Air Training and
Operating Procedures Standardizations (NATOPS) flight manual, reference 1. There are
two different models of the T-45, an A and a C model. The difference between the
models is that the T-45C is equipped with an advanced avionics suite that is not installed
in the T-45A. Students stationed at Kingsville, Texas fly the T-45A, while students
stationed in Meridian, Mississippi are trained in the T-45C. There are no differences in
the flying qualities or mechanical characteristics of the T-45 models. Tests that are
discussed in this thesis were conducted on T-45C Bureau Number (BuNo) 163635
(A037), which is an instrumented aircraft stationed at Patuxent River, MD.

ORGANIZATION
The T-45 fleet is comprised of two training squadrons at Naval Air Station (NAS)
Kingsville and NAS Meridian. To support those squadrons a program office is located at
Naval Air Weapons Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD), Patuxent River MD. The
program office oversees and coordinates all of the support provided by the competency
aligned organization of the Navy and the contractor / builder of the aircraft, Boeing St.
Louis.

All engineering support, for flight clearances and flight test support, from the

Navy for the platform comes from the 4.0-engineering competency.

Although

competency aligned, the organization is not co-located. The organization to support the
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fleet operations is comprised of three primary groups: maintenance, flight test and flight
clearance.

MAINTENANCE
For the maintenance engineering oversight, the Naval Air Depot (NADEP) is located at
NAS Cecil Field near Jacksonville, FL. The engineers who support this facility are part of
the 4.3 competency where the 3 is for the structures and airframe support group. When a
new maintenance procedure needs to be verified, the engineers from this group in Florida
need to travel to Meridian or Kingsville where the maintenance personnel are located and
the maintenance is actually performed.

Unlike most platforms in the Navy, the

maintenance on the T-45 is completed by the contractor, not enlisted Navy personnel, and
is completed at the site of the operational aircraft.

FLIGHT TEST
When a new system or piece of hardware is required, or a change to the standard
operating procedures is required, flight test is completed by a team at Patuxent River,
MD. This team is composed of engineers from the 4.11 competency where the 11
designates the flight test competency.

For this uplock test, the engineers are part of the

4.11.5.1 competency where the 5 denotes the installed propulsion and mechanical
systems branch and the 1 denotes the individuals as part of the fighter aircraft branch.
The aircrew and aircraft used for these tests are aligned with the Strike Test Squadron,
VX-23, (part of the 5.5 competency.)
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FLIGHT CLEARANCE
When a new piece of hardware is designed for an aircraft, it must be cleared by flight
clearance group, comprised of engineers from the 4.4 and / or 4.3 competency prior to
installation on the aircraft with an approved flight clearance. This same flight clearance
process applies to new maintenance procedures for the aircraft. The flight clearance
defines the limitations to the flight test aircraft, or to the fleet, for the installation of the
component or for the requirement to complete maintenance procedures after a certain
number of flight hours.

The 4.4 competency is responsible for propulsion or electrical

changes to the aircraft. The 4.3 competency is responsible for structural, flying qualities
and mechanical systems such as landing gear installed on the aircraft. Both of the 4.4 and
4.3 competencies are located at Patuxent River.

TEST PHILOSOPHY
In general, flight test teams are testing for improvements to problematic systems or issues
on an aircraft. For preparation of the test, the team needs to understand the operational
baseline in order to define the improvement. If nothing is known of the baseline, the
team will attempt to gather baseline data for comparison. During preparation for this test,
no data existed regarding the uplock mechanism and its environment as installed in the
aircraft. Minimal subassembly testing on the uplock latch had been completed at the
NADEP to investigate the forces required to move the uplock latch as installed on the test
bench.

In addition, a temperature survey was also completed to understand how

temperature changes affected the forces measured in the uplock system. As stated above,
the program office wanted to gain understanding of the uplock mechanism environment.
3

The test team wanted to gather initial data in the baseline configuration to understand the
potential problems that existed in the system. However, the flight clearance authority
decided that the original configuration was too risky and the team was required to make
the NADEP suggested changes prior to testing. Test points were designed to put large
loads on the landing gear and look at the vibratory characteristics of the landing gear
system.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
THE AIRCRAFT PROBLEM
In 2001 there were two cases of a single leg uncommanded main landing gear extension
during high airspeed and high g conditions. Both inadvertent extensions occurred during
the high g recovery of the Functional Check Flights (FCF) dive profile above 0.9 M.
The cases occurred on opposite sides; however, there were several electrical, hydraulic,
mechanical, and aerodynamic similarities. Two Class “A” mishaps, as defined by the
Naval Safety Center (Reference 2), caused by these gear failures occurred as a result of
landing gear overspeeds. Mishap Engineering Investigations (EIs) identified a number of
possible causal factors that may have contributed to the uncommanded landing gear
extensions: inadequate Main Landing Gear (MLG) uplock over-center distance (Figure 1,
Appendix A), interface dynamics between the uplock roller and latch (Figure 2,
Appendix A), mechanical interference between spring pin components and the beam
assembly (Figure 3, Appendix A), intermittent hydraulic pressure commanded by bad
weight-on-wheels (WOW) proximity switches, and excessive uplock latch friction.

A

description of each of these failure scenarios is included below in the background section.
What was not understood was if any single factor or a combination of factors was
required for the failure condition to occur. Several fixes had been identified by the
maintenance depot: a more robust WOW proximity switch, decreased friction in the main
rotation point bushing, and reduced mechanical interference between the spring and
aircraft structure.

The T-45 MLG was held in the retracted position by a hydro-

mechanical system, pressurized to 3000 psi by the hydraulic system 1 (HYD 1) and was
electrically controlled. The locking system for the gear consisted of an uplock roller on
5

the landing gear, an uplock latch mounted to the upper, internal structure of the wing,
hydraulic actuators, and electrical WOW proximity switches. The interface dynamics
between the roller and the latch, with the landing gear hydraulic system pressurized and
depressurized, was still unknown. Landing gear hydraulic system response to an
intermittent electrical signal from the WOW proximity switch and its effects on the
landing gear selector valve was not well understood. It was theorized that a hydraulic
spike would occur in the unlock line if the system became depressurized. The flight test
team was tasked by PMA 273 to design a flight test program that would provide data to
help understand the dynamic interface of the roller and the latch in damped (landing gear
hydraulics pressurized, i.e. normal hydraulic system) and undamped (landing gear
hydraulics depressurized) hydraulic conditions. In addition, the test program was to
assist in determining the effect of intermittent WOW proximity switches on landing gear
hydraulics and latch position.

EFFECTS ON THE FLEET
As a result of the single landing gear extensions occurring during high airspeed and high
g dive recoveries, airspeed restrictions were placed on the fleet aircraft. This decision
was made since high airspeed and high g combinations were common characteristics of
the two inadvertent landing gear extensions. Limiting the airspeed also limited the g
forces on the aircraft.

Since students do not spend significant time at high airspeeds

during their training period, the only portion of the curriculum that is affected is the
ability to complete high speed aircraft combat maneuvering (ACM). This limitation also
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required the fleet to obtain a waiver, which would allow them to complete FCF profiles
without the high-speed dive.

MAIN LANDING GEAR DESCRIPTION
To assist in the understanding of the casual factors, a description of the MLG system is
included here.

MAIN LANDING GEAR
The T-45 MLG is held in the gear well by a hydro-mechanical system, pressurized to
3000 psi by the HYD 1 system and is electrically controlled. The locking system for the
gear consists of an uplock roller on the landing gear (Figure 2, Appendix A), an uplock
latch mounted to the upper internal structure of the wing (Figure 4, Appendix A),
hydraulic actuators, and electrical WOW proximity switches (Figure 4-6, Appendix A).
The latch is spring loaded to the locked position. With the latch in the fully closed, overcenter position, the line of action created by the force of the roller resting on the latch
imparts a closing moment to the latch, Figure 2, Appendix A. The production priority
valve between the landing gear hydraulic lines and the remainder of the HYD 1 system
ensured that problems within the landing gear system did not affect control of the aircraft.
A schematic of the hydraulic system for the main and nose gear and for the electrical
sequencing of the landing gear are found in Figures 7 and 8 (Appendix A) respectively.
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MAIN LANDING GEAR DOOR
The T-45 MLG doors are attached to the aircraft by two hinges. The aft hinge can
support a maximum load of 3892 lbs and the forward hinge 1587 lbs The door uplock
mechanism, one in each wheel bay, consists of a roller on the door and an uplock bracket
mounted on the aft face of the auxiliary spar, Figure 5 (Appendix A). The latch overcenter and spring enable the uplock mechanism to mechanically support a maximum load
of 5130 lbs A Boeing structural analysis on the MLG door, (appendix B) indicated that
with the wheel resting on the door at 1g, the resultant loads on the aft hinge, forward
hinge, and uplock bracket would be 78.7 lbs, 36.2 lbs, and 106.1 lbs respectively. The
forward hinge, the limiting component, could sustain the force of the gear on the door up
to 23.2 gs (appendix B).

POSSIBLE CAUSAL FACTORS
OVER-CENTER DISTANCE
In the uplock mechanism, Figure 1 (Appendix A), the over-center distance was defined as
the calculated perpendicular distance between the load line and center of the hook pivot
point. The load line was defined as the line from the contact point of the hook/roller,
which passes through the roller center. Over-center distance was designed to be a
nominal positive 3.50 mm.

Accounting for production tolerances of the uplock

mechanism components and wing deflections during flight, this over-center distance
could be as small as 0.45 mm. When combined with the mechanical interference, there
was a concern that the over-center distance would become small enough to allow the
8

roller to push the latch open and allow the gear to fall onto the gear door during wing
deflection conditions. A Boeing engineering finite element model was used to predict
wing deflections.

A tolerance survey of the uplock components, which included

allowances for the interference due to wing deflection, determined that each mishap
aircraft had a positive 0.85mm over-center distance.

UPLOCK ROLLER
MANEUVERING

AND

LATCH

DYNAMICS

DURING

AIRCRAFT

Longitudinal movement of the roller within the clevis and latch hook may reduce overcenter distance, Figures 1 through 2 (Appendix A). In the up and locked position, the
roller is held in place between the uplock clevis and uplock latch. The theory was that
the roller might float between the clevis and the latch with increasing positive g. Roller
float combined with the dynamic response of the roller and latch, and a small over-center
distance, may produce a negative over-center distance that will allow the roller to fall
past the latch into the gear well under positive g loads greater than 2.3 g. Once the gear
has fallen past the dagger lever that sequences the changeover valve, the gear door will be
hydraulically commanded open. Under sufficient g, the outward force on the gear would
overcome the retract actuator and allow the gear to fall into the airstream.

MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE
Mechanical interference between the uplock assembly upper spring pin and the wing
beam assembly cutout was identified as another significant factor in uncommanded gear
extension. As the g force on the aircraft increases, the wing structure deflects causing the
9

wall of the spring pin structural slot (see Figures 2 and 3, Appendix A) to push the spring
pin upward. This interference causes the uplock latch to rotate in the unlocking direction
while the roller simultaneously overcomes the actuator force and rests on the latch.
Design and assembly tolerances allow for this condition. In this situation, significant
interference could allow the latch to fully open and allow the gear to extend under high g
conditions when the weight of the gear overpowers the retract actuator resulting in the
gear extending at high g and high-speed conditions.

FRICTION
High uplock latch friction forces could impede return of the uplock latch to the fully
closed position following the mechanical interference noted above.

The maximum

allowable frictional force for the installed uplock latch was designed to be 9 lbs with the
gear extended and 6 lbs with the gear retracted as defined by Boeing, reference 4. In-lab
tests indicated frictional forces decrease as the temperature decreases. However, when
similar temperature comparison tests were conducted at high levels of humidity, the
frictional forces increased significantly as the temperature decreased. The landing gear
actuator was designed to hold the gear in the up position against the top of the uplock
clevis. However, further analysis revealed that above 2.3 gs, the actuator is no longer
able to support the weight of the gear. At this point, the uplock latch was responsible for
retaining the roller while the hydraulic pressure provided damping of gear roller motion.
If spring pin interference under high-g loads moves the latch, and friction prevents the
latch from closing, the roller could fall out of the uplock mechanism. If the gear passed
through the dagger lever, the gear door would be commanded open. Above 2.3 gs the
10

gear would continue to overpower the retract actuator and extend into the airstream
which would result in aircraft damage at high speeds.

WEIGHT ON WHEELS PROXIMITY SWITCH FAILURE
The aircraft was designed with a WOW proximity switch to prevent the gear from being
retracted on the ground. Age or maintenance malpractice were believed to have caused
cracks in the ceramic switch faces which allowed moisture intrusion on both of the
mishap aircraft. Bench testing, at Jacksonville and St. Louis, indicated sporadic open and
closed WOW proximity switch failures. Ground testing also indicated that moisture at
the crack locations could cause the state of the switch to oscillate between open and
closed. If this switch failed in the open position (weight-on-wheels), the landing gear
selector valve would be de-energized and moved to the neutral position (hydraulic power
removed from the landing gear system). While in the neutral position, hydraulic pressure
in the landing gear system is not available to hold the roller against the uplock clevis or
provide damping against undesirable motion.

If the switch failed intermittently the

landing gear selector valve would toggle between the neutral and locked position.
Therefore, if power was removed, the roller rested upon the uplock latch and relied solely
on the latch to hold the roller and landing gear in position. Under these conditions, the
movement of the roller between the clevis and latch was described as undamped. The
belief was that flight maneuvering and buffet conditions in an undamped state combined
with a small over-center distance would increase the probability of an uncommanded gear
extension.
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The theory was if the WOW proximity switch intermittently fails to weight-on-wheels,
the landing gear selector valve de-energizes, the “lock” line depressurizes, and a pressure
spike occurs in the “unlock” pressure line. If this spike was large enough, that hydraulic
pressure could drive the uplock latch to the open position via the gear uplock actuator,
Figure 6, Appendix A. With the latch in the open position, the following sequence is
assumed to occur:
a. The roller releases and the wheel assembly rests inside of the gear door (gear
door would remain closed due to the lack of hydraulic pressure therefore the gear
does not inadvertently extend into the airstream).
b. The WOW proximity switch then re-energizes to weight-off-wheels, which
commands the following simultaneously:
1. The landing gear selector valve repressurizes, which commanded the
gear actuator to re-raise and re-lock the gear.
2. The gear door opens momentarily due to the return of the hydraulic
pressure.
c. After the gear moved up past the dagger lever and returned to the position
between the clevis and latch, the gear door closed and locked.

INSTRUMENTATION
The three instrumentation modifications made to the airframe included: a video camera
aimed at the uplock mechanism in each MLG well, accelerometers in the left MLG well,
and a switch in the cockpit to simulate failed WOW proximity switch.

12

HYDRAULIC LINES
In order to document pressure in the lock and unlock lines of the MLG hydraulic system,
both of the hydraulic lines on the left uplock actuator were instrumented with wet
pressure transducers. The transducers limited the use of the aircraft due to the potential
loss of hydraulic pressure in the event of a transducer failure; therefore, the instrumented
lines were installed only during hydraulic pressure spike investigation flight.

CAMERA SYSTEM
A 30-frame/second camera and light source were mounted in each MLG wheel well in
order to monitor the roller and latch motion, Figure 9, Appendix A.

The video was

monitored real time to ensure that the gear was up and locked.

COCKPIT CONTROL SWITCH FOR CONTROL OF LANDING GEAR SELECTOR
VALVE VOLTAGE
The hydraulic pressure in the landing gear system is controlled by voltage signals from
the WOW switch to the selector valve. When 28V is supplied to the selector valve
(weight off wheels), the hydraulic system is pressurized to 3000 psi allowing normal
retractions or extensions. When voltage is removed from the landing gear selector valve,
removing hydraulic pressure from the MLG system, the landing gear roller goes to the
neutral position and rests upon the main landing gear uplock latch. Instrumentation
wiring was tapped into pin-A of the MLG selector valve in order to bypass the WOW
proximity switch and allow control of the 28V via a control switch in the cockpit. A
schematic of the installation is seen in Figure 10 (Appendix A.) The switch in the forward
13

cockpit was placed on the right console as seen in Figure 11 (Appendix A.) The switch
was labeled with “NORMAL” and “DISABLE” positions. In order to move the switch
between positions, the switch had to first be pulled upward and then moved to the
appropriate position, which ensured that the switch was not accidentally moved during
flight. Placing the cockpit switch in the “DISABLE” position created the simulated
failed WOW proximity switch since no voltage was going to the selector valve thus
removing the hydraulic pressure in the uplock system.

Leaving the switch in the

“DISABLE” position allowed the roller and latch interaction to be investigated in an
undamped condition. Toggling the switch represented an intermittent WOW proximity
switch and was used to investigate a potential hydraulic pressure spike in the lock and
unlock lines of the uplock mechanism.

ACCELEROMETER BLOCKS
Three accelerometers, in X, Y, and Z axes, were mounted on the left wheel well, upper
internal surface of the wing, Figure 12 (Appendix A.) Three accelerometers, in X, Y, and
Z axes, were mounted on the left MLG, approximately six inches up the strut from the
uplock roller, Figure 13 (Appendix A). All accelerometers were Endevco model 7290A30.
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CHAPTER 3: TEST EXECUTION AND RESULTS
SCOPE OF TESTS
The evaluation was conducted during a one-hour ground test and six dedicated flights of
approximately one hour each during daylight visual meteorological conditions (VMC)
within the local restricted areas of NAWCAD Patuxent River.

Turbulence and

temperatures were not recorded during the flight test portion of this test. Ambient
temperature measurements of the uplock mechanisms were approximated during the
maintenance investigation.

The test envelope is presented in Table 1.

The test

configurations are defined in Table 2. A full documentation of the test results can be
found in the interim and final test report, references 5 and 6 respectively.

Table 1
T-45C TEST ENVELOPE
Parameter
Actual maximum value
Test Limit/ Original
Aircraft Limit(1)
achieved
NATOPS Limit
Airspeed
468 KIAS
550 KIAS
480 KIAS
Altitude
33,630 ft MSL
41,000 ft MSL
41,000 ft MSL
Mach number
0.94
1.04
0.8
Angle of Attack MAX Available
None
None
Load Factor
7.8(2)
7.33g sym > 5K(3)
7.33g sym > 5K(3)
Gear Airspeed
N/A
200 KIAS
200 KIAS
Gear Load
N/A
0-2 g
0-2 g
Note: (1) Current NATOPS Restriction as a result of uncommanded extensions, prior to the completion of the
Rapid Action Maintenance Engineering Changes (RAMECs).
(2) Measured for less than a second during to Wind Up Turn (WUT) due to pitch buck.
(3) Calculated based on aircraft weight.
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Configuration
Cruise (CR)
Power Approach
(PA)
Ground Test

Flaps
Up
Full

Table 2
T-45C TEST CONFIGURATIONS
Slats
Gear
Speedbrake Comments
Retracted Up
Retracted
Extended Down
Extended

N/A

N/A

As
Required

N/A

Aircraft on Jacks
External Power
External Hydraulics

METHOD OF TEST
The test matrix for ground and flight test conducted is presented in table 4 (Appendix C).
Flight test consisted of Wind Up Turns (WUTs), high-speed dives, and pushovers to
collect information on roller, latch, and landing gear. In addition to the flight maneuvers,
hydraulic pressure in the landing gear system was manipulated through the use of the
cockpit control switch. Ground latch force test data was collected with the use of a
digital camera, hand held force gauge and a ruler. During the flight tests, onboard video,
altitude, airspeed, aircraft Nx, Ny, and Nz of the wing and landing gear accelerometer
blocks were monitored. Flight test points were built up from high to low altitude and low
to high g. As a safety method, all test points were completed with the landing gear
hydraulics depressurized, to prevent the landing gear door from opening in the event that
the landing gear roller fell past the latch leaving the landing gear resting on the door. If
the hydraulics had not been depressurized, the roller falling past the latch would have
resulted in another inadvertent landing gear extension. For the simulated failed WOW
proximity switch test, pressure transducers were installed in the unlock and lock pressure
lines of the left main landing gear uplock mechanism. The pressure measurements
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enabled the test team to confirm if the landing gear selector valve was working per
design.

RESULTS AND EVALUATION
GROUND TESTS
Installation of Components
Rapid Action Maintenance Engineering Changes (RAMECS) 021 and 023 procedures
were verified and completed at NAS Kingsville and published as Airframe Change
(AFC) 266 and 267, respectively. The verification set of uplocks were then shipped to
NAWCAD Patuxent River as Ready For Installation (RFI) components for test purposes.
Prior to removal of the non-reworked uplocks, force measurements of the uplock latch
were taken as required by Airframe Bulletin (AFB) 180, and were less than 7.5 lbs on
either uplock. The AFC uplocks were then installed into A037 (SD205).

After installation of the uplocks, with AFC 266 and AFC 267 incorporated, the friction
measurements were taken with the gear down. The left uplock measured 7.5 lbs and the
right uplock measured 10 lbs. The uplock springs were removed and the spring forces
were individually measured. The springs were outside their 6 lbs limit by between 0.25
lbs and

1 lb and the four springs were replaced. The final limit in AFC267 rev A was

6-7 lb, which would have allowed the original test springs to be acceptable under the new
procedures. The individual uplock mechanisms were also visually inspected, and the
right uplock appeared to be sticking when manually attempting to rotate the latch. The
RFI uplocks were then disassembled and the shim material was measured. The right
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uplock had three shims totaling 0.012 in. which did not provide the appropriate amount of
required freeplay (0.002 in.), so the shims were replaced with two shims that were 0.014
in. thick and created 0.002 in. of freeplay. With the new shims, the right uplock was able
to rotate freely under its own weight; however, when reinstalled the uplock still measured
over 9 lb gear down. When the measurements were repeated by different people or in a
slightly different location or direction on the latch, different values were obtained by up
to a 1 lb force difference between measurements. Engineering logs of the maintenance
completed and the measurements taken during the troubleshooting time are included in
Appendix D. This 1 lb is greater than the 10% variation in measurement compared to the
maximum allowed 7.5 to 9 lbs force measurement. The technique for measuring uplock
mechanism friction, described in AFC 267 did not produce repeatable values. For this
reason, post maintenance installation friction measurements in AFC 267 were removed
via AFC 267 Amendment 1 (AFC 267-1). AFC 267 was not an acceptable procedure as
released due to the invalid measurement techniques. The recommended procedures for
measuring the individual spring forces and verifying that the installed uplock latch rotates
freely under its own weight with the springs disconnected were accepted as a replacement
for AFC267 and AFC 267–1 in AFC267 Revision A.

While troubleshooting the AFC 267 and 267-1 uplocks, the right uplock appeared to have
a friction band in the target link assembly bushing, Figure 14 (Appendix A.) This
bushing was original equipment and not changed or redesigned by AFC267 or AFC2671. The friction was reduced when the target link assemblies were disassembled and
cleaned, the bushing inspected, and the system put back together enabling the
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components to meet the free-fall requirements. The target link assemblies were found to
be a contributory factor to the overall friction in the uplock mechanism. AFC 267 and
AFC 267 Amendment 1 were not acceptable as written because they did not address the
additional friction in the uplock mechanism due to the target link assembly bushing. The
target link bushing procedures were added to AFC267 Revision A. It was recommended
to add a time interval inspection of the system to ensure that excessive friction is
discovered and promptly corrected, however, this recommendation has not been accepted
by the NADEP at this time. Since the target link assembly bushings were cleaned and
replaced, and the free fall requirements were met, the uplocks for the rest of the test will
be referred to as AFC 267 with representative revision A incorporated for the remainder
of this document.

Over-Center Distance
Since over-center distance was considered one of the largest contributing factors to gear
inadvertently falling, the team decided to try to calculate the over-center distance of the
two test uplocks. Using the cameras that were installed for real time flight monitoring
and a ruler, the team attempted to get the measurements required to calculate the installed
over-center distance as shown in Figure 1 (Appendix A.) The aircraft was placed on
jacks, the gear was raised and the gear doors were left open. Several techniques were
attempted to collect the needed information to calculate the over-center distance. The
first was to hold rulers in the wheel well and use the installed video system, lights and
cameras. The large amount of light that was provided by the installed video systems
created a glare that washed out the ruler measurements and the uplock components. The
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video system light was then disconnected and a small external light source was used to
prevent the wash out of the ruler measurements and components. This technique created
human interference, since the space where the rulers have to be placed is very confined.
Marks were then placed on the airframe structure, which was slightly in front of the
uplock mechanism, and the external light source was used to take the still pictures using
installed video system. The pictures came out very clear, without a large amount of
distortion or human interference.

The pictures were printed and analyzed; however,

since the components were not well labeled and the cameras were not placed at a 90°
angle to the uplock mechanism, a parallax was created which prevented accurate overcenter measurements.

Due to the difficulties associated with obtaining the over-center

measurement, the requirement was dropped.

An over-center measurement was not

possible within the scope of this test. To avoid the parallax discovered during this test, I
recommended removing the wheel assembly and using of a camera placed at a 90° for
over-center measurements or other measurements of this type in the future.

I also

recommend making well-defined marks and measurement markings on the system in the
same plane as the mechanism for future measurements.

FLIGHT TEST
Airspeed restrictions were originally placed on the fleet aircraft as an attempt to prevent
any further events of landing gear inadvertently extending in flight. This decision was
made since a common characteristic of the two inadvertent landing gear accidents was a
high airspeed and high g combination. By limiting the airspeed the intent was to limit the
available g of the aircraft as well. The possible causal factors listed earlier, identified
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Table 3
UPLOCK CONFIGURATIONS FOR FLIGHT
Configuration
L Uplock
R Uplock
A
AFC 266 and 267 with
AFC 266 and 267 with
representative revision A
representative revision A
B
AFC 266 and 267 with
AFC 267 with
representative revision A
representative revision A
items other than airspeed that were to be investigated during this test, mainly component
installation, buffet and g characteristics. In order to minimize the potential of inadvertent
landing gear extensions, flights 1606 through 1610 were flown with reconfigured uplock
mechanisms that had incorporated AFC 266 and AFC 267 with representative revision A
incorporated. The next flight, 1611, was the hydraulic pressure spike investigation. No
noticeable motion was observed during initial testing. AFC 266 was then removed,
reinstalling the larger spring pin into the right-hand uplock assembly, in attempt to
initiate latch motion during flight. The final flight, 1620, was with the larger spring pin
and was comprised of WUTs with the hydraulics depressurized. A table of uplock
configurations is documented in table 3.

Wind Up Turns
Wind Up Turns (WUTs), where g is maintained by sacrificing altitude in a turn, were
used to create buffet and g conditions to understand the roller and latch dynamics. Test
conditions were created based on the wing buffet response contour plot depicted in
Figure 15 (Appendix A.)

Proposed WUT test points were determined by looking at the

buffet contour plot and increasing in g and decreasing in altitude within the envelop of
the mishap aircraft as depicted in Figure 16 (Appendix A.)
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Initial WUTs were

performed with the hydraulics depressurized (undamped latch/ roller contact) to ensure
that the gear door would not open if the roller fell past the latch during the maneuvers
(Appendix B).

The remainder of the WUTs were completed with normal hydraulic

pressure (damped latch/roller contact). A final set of test points was completed with the
hydraulics depressurized (undamped) with the thicker diameter spring pin installed in the
right side of the aircraft. On the first attempt to complete the 7g WUT with the pitch
buck phenomena and the placement of the instrumentation, the aircraft achieved 7.8g for
less than a second, which exceeded the 7.33 g limit. In order to prevent any future g
exceedences, the remainder of the 7 g WUTs were completed with a 6.5g target. A plot of
the WUTs that were completed in the undamped and damped configurations is presented
in Figures 19 and 20 (Appendix A), respectively.

Wind Up Turns With AFC 266 and 267 With Representative Revision A Completed
(Configuration A)
WUTs with AFC 266 and 267 with representative revision A completed, configuration A,
were used to evaluate the roller and latch dynamics that might be occurring in the landing
gear environment. Prior to conducting tests points depicted in Figure 16 (Appendix A), a
pushover to 0.5 g at 10,000 ft was performed to understand the response of the freefloating roller. Turns were started at high altitudes, low Mach number and low g with a
buildup in g and then in Mach number. All of the undamped dynamics points were
completed prior to the damped dynamics WUTs. During the evaluation the cameras were
used to evaluate any potential motion that was occurring during the test point. During the
undamped dynamics points, the only motion detected occurred when the cockpit switch
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was moved to the DISABLE position, at which point the roller would fall on the latch.
This movement of the roller falling on the latch is loud enough to be heard in the cockpit.
During the damped points, the only motion detected occurred on test points that were
over 3 g, when the roller fell away from the top of the clevis. A potential for the roller to
fall past the latch did not occur at any time during any of the wind up turns. In
configuration A, no roller or latch dynamics were discovered that would cause the
inadvertent landing gear extension. Since the uplock mechanism showed no tendencies
to move during WUTs with both AFCs installed, no conclusion could be drawn as to the
cause of the inadvertent gear extensions which resulted in two class “A” mishaps. With
the AFC 266 and 267 revision A installed the uplock system operated satisfactorily and
should prevent future inadvertent landing gear extensions.

Wind Up Turns With AFC 266 Removed From Right Uplock (Configuration B)
After no motion was detected during the WUTs and FCF dive profile test points with
configuration A installed, it was necessary to investigate if potential motion existed in the
original configuration.

The only configuration that was deemed safe enough to

investigate was with the larger diameter spring pin installed (pre AFC 266) in one of the
uplocks.

The airplane was then reconfigured to configuration B, and as a preventative

measure, test points 2-1 through 2-20, of Table 4 (Appendix C), were completed. For
safety reasons the first flight was flown in the undamped state to prevent the landing gear
door from opening in the event that the roller fell past the latch. During the first several
points at 5g and below no noticeable motion occurred. On test point 2-17 of Table 4
(Appendix C), at 15,000 ft MSL, 6.2g and 0.79 M no noticeable motion occurred. At the
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next test point, 11,000 ft, 6.5g and 0.72 M, slight motion on the spring was noticed in the
direction to open the latch. The g levels achieved on the 6.5g point in all three axes on the
wing and the landing gear accelerometers are depicted in Figure 17 and 18 (Appendix A),
respectively. Even with the motion of the spring no motion of the latch appeared. On a
subsequent test point targeting a higher Mach number point, only 6.2 g was achieved. No
motion of the latch or the spring was observed. No further points were repeated as a
safety precaution. Without AFC 266 installed, slight motion is evident in the spring in
the direction of opening the latch. When combined with a small over-center distance this
could pose as a potential cause for the inadvertent landing gear extensions.

Function Check Flight Dive Profiles
The two events where the landing gear inadvertently extended during high g and high
airspeed conditions are presented in Figure 16 (Appendix A). The first event occurred at
PAX during the recovery from an FCF dive.

The second event occurred at NAS

Kingsville during a high speed dive recovery. In order to look at the landing gear
environment during high g and high airspeed conditions, FCF dives were performed in
the undamped and damped conditions in configuration A. As a build-up, the undamped
profile was completed first. Two dives were performed after the completion of all other
testing at the end of flight 1610. The undamped and damped dive profiles are depicted in
Figures 19 and 20 (Appendix A), respectfully to demonstrate where the test points were
in comparison to the dive profiles of the mishap aircraft and the originally planned test
points.

The maximum recovery pulls of the undamped and damped dive profiles were

3.35g at 473 KIAS on the undamped and 3.7g at 473 KIAS, respectively. No motion was
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observed in either uplock. High speed and high g created during the dive profile created
no evidence for a potential cause for the gear to inadvertently extend with AFC 266 and
267 with representative revision A incorporated. With the AFC 266 and 267 revision A
installed, the uplock system operates satisfactorily and should prevent future inadvertent
landing gear extensions.

AFC 266 and 267 revision A are now incorporated into fleet

aircraft.

Hydraulic Pressure Spike Test
To analyze the concern of potential hydraulic fluctuations that would occur in the event
of intermittent proximity switch failure, the hydraulic spike test flight was completed.
During this test AFC 266 and 267 with representative revision A were installed. Two wet
pressure transducers were installed on the left uplock lock and unlock actuator lines to
measure the hydraulic pressure in each line. The pressure transducers were sampled at a
rate of 430 Hz to capture any hydraulic spikes. The control switch that was installed at
the beginning of the program that allowed for the undamped and damped WUT
investigation was now used to toggle and created fluctuating pressures in the lock and
unlock lines of the uplock mechanism. The hydraulic spike test was completed on flight
1611. The flight was limited to airspeeds below 180 KCAS (20 KCAS below NATOPS
gear transition/ extension limit) as a risk mitigation for the potential hydraulic spike in the
unlock line and possible inadvertent landing gear extension which were under
investigation. The test started with monitoring the hydraulic pressure during a normal
landing gear extension. The gear was retracted and the switch was then used to turn off
the hydraulic pressure for different periods of time and toggled at different frequencies to
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simulate a failed intermittent WOW switch. During the test, no tendency for the roller to
fall past the latch was observed. A video clip of test point 4-2, from flight 1611 is
included as Figure 21 (Appendix A). When the gear is in the up and locked position, the
lock pressure is maintained at approximately 3000 psi, Figure 22 (Appendix A). When
the switch was toggled, the largest pressure that was observed in the unlock actuator lines
was less than 450 psi, Figure 23 (Appendix A), during test point 4-6 of Table 4
(Appendix C.) The lack of large pressures in the unlock line indicates that the pressure is
inadequate to physically open the latch. During normal operation, approximately 2900
psi is provided to the actuator to open the latch, Figure 24 (Appendix A). The hydraulic
pressure spike that occurs in the unlock line during a simulated intermittent WOW
proximity switch is significantly smaller than pressure that occurs to open the latch for a
normal gear extension. With AFC 266 and 267 revision A an intermittent WOW switch
was not considered a contributing factor for inadvertent landing gear extensions.

26

CHAPTER 4: ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTS ON TEST RESULTS
BACKGROUND OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PROBLEMS
There were several issues that occurred during the planning and preparation of the project
that were due to the unusual group dynamics. According to Fred Luthans, reference 7,
the factors that can decrease group cohesiveness are the following: disagreement on
goals, large group size, unpleasant experiences, intragroup competition, and domination
by one or more members. Although the group had a common goal to safely get the fleet
a full NATOPS envelope, it is my opinion that for this test all of the issues defined by
Luthans existed for one reason or another among the contractor, the maintenance support,
the flight test team, and the flight clearance team, which made achieving this goal a
difficult task.

CONTRACTOR
The contractor initially disagreed about the need for this test and was unwilling to support
the requirement for the test. The contractor believed that the problem had been identified
and was going to be fixed with the mechanical changes recommended by the
maintenance engineers.

Although these changes were going to be a positive

improvement, based on ground testing and the mishap investigation, it was not certain
that other contributory factors were not present: i.e. high vibrations, or the potential of
hydraulic spikes.

After discussions with the contractor, it appeared that the major

concern was that the flight test results might result in a possible redesign. If the design
was found to be inadequate, the contractor would face a significant financial obligation.
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The risk was a disincentive to perform the test, even though it was admitted that the
landing gear environment was not well understood.

MAINTENANCE SUPPORT
Maintenance support personnel from Navy system engineers in Florida, and contract
maintainers in Texas were involved in troubleshooting the problem that was limiting the
fleet flight envelope. The engineers in Florida were part of the civil service support of
the Navy, the maintainers in Texas were Boeing contractors.

In addition to the

maintainers in Texas there was a group of Boeing maintainers at Patuxent River, on a
different contract, whose sole function is to support the two flight test aircraft at Patuxent
River. In general, the maintenance team was comprised of a set of groups whose conflict
arose from protecting their own interest, decreasing their group cohesiveness to support
the maintenance actions required to correct the uplock problem.

The initial engineering investigations of the mishap aircraft proved that there were a few
mechanical changes that could be made to improve the system reliability. While these
hardware improvements were in the paperwork cycle for release to the fleet for
execution, the test team was planning a flight test program that would determine if there
were other causal factors related to the mishaps. The flight test investigation would allow
the team to determine if the proposed improvements were actually improvements. The
goal was that the flight test would be completed prior to releasing the procedures to the
fleet, giving the program confidence that the procedures were adequate.
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FLIGHT CLEARANCE
In the overall organization, the flight clearance team is considered the system experts and
has the authority to impose and remove limitations on flight conditions of configurations
of a fleet and/or flight test aircraft. According to Luthans, reference 7, authority
legitimizes and is a source of power, which could be observed in the role that the flight
clearance team held in the execution of this test. The role as the system expert enabled
the flight clearance group to impose restrictions that were not considered reasonable by
the flight test team in order to determine the true cause of the initial mishaps. The
limitation imposed required the flight test aircraft to fly in the NADEP approved fleet
configuration with the improvements already in place. The imposed limitation was a
result of the unpleasant experience caused by the two mishaps that had already occurred
and the fear that any limitation or lack of limitation would be a reflection of the flight
clearance organization if the flight test resulted in another mishap. The use of power at
the time reduced the opportunity for group cohesiveness since the imposed flight
clearance severely restricted the flight test team’s ability to determine a causal factor.

FLIGHT TEST TEAM
The flight test team had to deal with several obstacles on the road to meet the ultimate
goal, safely getting the fleet a full NATOPS envelope. The flight test team has the
responsibility to find the source of problems. The perception regarding this responsibility
can be positive or negative, depending on where an individual resides in the organization.
The program office would like to understand if there are any unknowns out there and
would also like to prove that the proposed solutions are solutions. The contractor would
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not like an answer that costs money, but would like to know that the problem is fixed.
The maintenance team would like to ensure that their proposed fix works, however,
would not like a failure.

The flight test either answers the problem or is the start of a

new investigation, if the problem still remains. The flight test team also has no authority
to change the flight configuration if the tests need to be performed outside the current
fleet limit or if the configuration is not approved for the fleet. Although there is a lack of
authority there is the perception that the flight test engineers do have what is considered
Expert Power (Luthans, reference 7, page 361.) The flight test group’s expert power is
based on their extended experience with the aircraft as well as fleet experience. The
flight test group’s expert power provides some leverage when trying to obtain new limits.

The desire of a flight test engineer is to modify a configuration as little as possible, while
maintaining safety, and then modify one item at a time in order to obtain clear test results.
It is difficult to understand the cause when more than one variable has changed at the
same time.

Therefore, the test team tried to maintain the original configuration with a

plan to modify one component at a time.

This plan included the necessary safety

precautions that needed to be in place. The team struggled to use the knowledge gained
about the safety precautions that were in place combined with and the concern that the
test would not produce the desired results if executed in the changed configuration,
demonstrating again the lack of group cohesiveness. Unfortunately, the test team’s
recommendation did not prevail due to the overriding fear.
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TEST IMPACTS
TEST PLANNING
The flight clearance for the test aircraft mandated that the proposed test could not be
performed with the current installed configuration uplocks for safety reasons. The flight
test team struggled with this requirement, since it was believed that the initial problem
would not be understood if the mandated changes did fix the problem. The concern that
another mishap could occur during the testing became the overriding factor and the
restriction for the new components remained. With this restriction, the purpose of the test
changed from gaining understanding of the initial cause of the mishap, to ensuring that
with the flight clearance mandated fixes installed there were no lingering problems. The
flight test team believed that the installed cameras provided a level of safety not present
before.

The test team would be able to observe dangerous trends during the build-up

from low speeds with low g components to those with higher airspeeds and higher g
components.

The lack of fundamental understanding of the landing gear system

environment created significant discomfort for the flight clearance team who is ultimately
responsible for the limitations placed on the fleet. Although several arguments to fly the
mishap configuration were made and the safety precautions were explained, the flight
clearance mandated uplocks were installed for the start of testing. .

EFFECTS ON GROUND TEST
Providing an RFI set of uplocks in time for the flight test team to start testing, prior to
release of those procedures to the fleet, was a difficult problem for the maintenance team
in Texas. In order to modify a set of uplock components for flight, it was necessary to
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complete a validation and verification of the procedures. Early in the preparation the
flight test team and all members of the maintenance support team decided that the
validation and verification should not be performed on the flight test aircraft. Procedures
were validated at the maintenance facility in Texas and RFI uplocks were delivered to the
flight test team.

As stated earlier, the RFI uplocks did not properly install into the test aircraft. The
friction levels exceeded the maintenance procedure requirements. Initially, the theory
was that the friction measurements were being taken with an inappropriate technique.
Several measurement attempts with different techniques and different individuals taking
the measurements were made to try and understand the problem. After several days of
unsuccessful troubleshooting, there appeared to be a condition that Luthans describes as
Functional Conflict (reference 7, page 316) between the NADEP and the flight test team,
since the flight test engineers were rewriting maintenance procedures based on
troubleshooting completed on the flight test aircraft. This functional conflict occurred
when the flight test team claimed that there was something wrong with the uplocks
maintenance procedures as installed on the flight test aircraft. Flight test engineers are
accustomed to finding problems with a product, but generally allow the contractor or
NADEP to find a solution. The engineer maintenance support felt that the flight test
engineers were overstepping the bounds of their responsibilities. It was determined that
the only method to resolve the conflict and resolve the installation problem was to allow
the NADEP engineers from Florida to aid in troubleshooting the procedures. Once the
engineers were on site, the troubleshooting was completed fairly quickly and new
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procedures were released. With the new procedures released and the uplocks cleared for
flight, the test was finally able to begin.

EFFECTS ON FLIGHT TEST
As stated earlier, the requirement to perform flight test with reconfigured uplocks
installed was imposed due to the perception of high safety risk using older uplocks. The
flight test team hoped that there would be no additional problems discovered, however
this created a dilemma for the test team. With no other problems identified, there was no
way the team could confirm that a problem existed with the old uplocks as configured in
the mishap aircraft.

Early in the planning stages, the question was posed to the flight

clearance group what would be the troubleshooting path if no problems were identified
with the new uplocks installed. The flight clearance team felt that the old uplocks
presented an unacceptably high risk, however that a flight test was needed to confirm the
new uplock’s viability.

At the completion of the WUT phase of testing, there had been no obvious problems
identified. At all of the high g points there was no obvious movement of the system. The
team then investigated the hydraulic pressure. The hope was that the pressure changes, as
seen in Figure 23 (Appendix A), might lead to the ultimate causal factor. Unfortunately,
the results were inconclusive and the team was left without an obvious answer. The
flight test team, using the experience and results of the tests that had been completed,
requested a new flight clearance that would allow the original configuration to be flown.
The flight test community felt that it was their responsibility to find an answer, even if
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the answer was that there was no problem with the initial installation. At the end of the
evaluation with the flight clearance mandated uplocks installed, everyone on the team
was left without an answer. Opinions were now changing as to the need for further
testing with some part of the original uplock. It was in everyone’s best interest to prove
that the new maintenance procedures had fixed the problem.

The flight test community led the discussion with the flight clearance authority about
options for future testing and the lack of an answer from the previous testing. Using the
results of no motion of any component of the uplock during previous testing, and the
increased knowledge that if the hydraulics were depressurized, that the landing gear
could not fall into the airstream and result in third mishap, the flight test team was able to
gain the clearance to test with the larger spring pin installed. The system engineers
believed that the larger spring pin was the most likely cause for motion in the system and
thus prove that a problem had been resolved with the new hardware. After the first series
of testing with the old, larger diameter, spring pin installed, motion was observed during
the WUTs. The T-45 program office concluded that the problem had been resolved and
future mishaps resulting in the possible loss of aircrew and aircraft was eliminated.

34

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
TEST RESULTS
Through several iterations of testing, it was determined that the large spring pin diameter
and the friction in the uplock mechanism were the contributory factors of the two
mishaps. The hydraulic pressure spikes that were believed to occur, did occur, however,
they were not large enough to open the latch.

The intermittent proximity switches are

possible contributors when combined with a high amount of friction in the system;
however, the proximity switches alone could not have contributed to the mishaps, due to
the small magnitude hydraulic pressure spikes in the system. Although the lock line
drops approximately 2500 psi during the switch toggling as seen in Figures 22 (Appendix
A), the unlock line experiences only an average 250 psi spike increase during the same
toggling as seen in Figure 23 (Appendix A.) This 250 psi is minute compared to the 2700
psi that is required in the unlock line during a normal gear extension, Figure 24
(Appendix A.) The requirement for the new component was released to the fleet, and at
the current time, all fleet aircraft have the new components installed and have returned to
a full fleet NATOPS operational limits.

TEAM INTERACTION
Team interaction was a driving factor in the outcome of this uplock test. A mechanical
system that has been installed and operational for several years would seem simple to test
and prove. In a time when job security is in question in the aerospace market, even in a
government job, the maintenance support team had a conflicting goal in the design of the
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maintenance solution for the uplock problem. The goal to ensure that they maintained
their jobs ensured that they participated in the design solution. At the same time, the
government and contractor were competing with each other to avoid being perceived as
the responsible party in the decision. Despite the shared goal of saving the fleet from
future mishaps, the decision making of both maintenance teams also considered the issue
of whether the system improvement was going to justify the cost for fleet
implementation. Lower level independent goals and barriers can prevent the attainment
of the ultimate goal. The lower level goal included avoiding incurring additional costs,
while the fear of not having complete understanding of the system and the lack of
knowledge of previous problems created a barrier to getting to the ultimate answer or
what was the initial problem. Ultimately, the team was able to overcome these barriers to
determine that there was a problem and with the testing completed, eliminated problem
with the current installation.

RECOMMENDATIONS
TEST RESULTS
From the results of the ground test and the flight test, the recommendation to install the
new components was confirmed.

However, there are still two outstanding

recommendations that will probably not be implemented for political and financial
reasons. The first recommendation was an interval inspection on the components to
ensure that dirt did not induce friction into the uplock components that would increase the
risk of the uplock failure. The reason for not accepting this recommendation is that the
inspection was invasive to the landing gear system and that it would require a large
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amount of down time on the aircraft, because the disengagement of the springs would
cause several follow on ground tests that were time consuming. Also, the system experts
believed that the problem would be identified during preventative maintenance
inspections of the landing gear and that separate inspections were not required.

The second recommendation was a redesign of the system. Although, the system that is
currently installed is acceptable for the task, it does not allow adequate margin for error
in friction, installation or spring stiffness. There still remains a possibility that a future
inadvertent landing gear extension could occur for an unknown reason. The design of the
test described here is very limited in scope.

There are other areas, including the

proximity switches that are in the redesign process that should decrease the possibility of
a failure. However, with a gap in the latch, there remains the remote possibility that the
roller can fall past the latch into the airstream. Since the re-design requirements would be
very extensive and costly, it was determined that the redesign would not be pursued. The
primary fleet operational envelope is inside the envelope that was imposed to prevent the
failure.

The redesign recommendation would be a stronger one from the test team if the

exposure of the fleet to high g and high airspeed test points were more frequent.

TEAM INTERACTIONS
It is important when everyone has the same goal that the team takes the time to
concentrate on the goal. If necessary, as it was in this test, bring the team members
together, especially when not centrally located, and work to find common norms and
standards and a path to achieve the ultimate goal.
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It is also important for the team

interactions, to build trust and knowledge that authority will not be misused. Teams need
to understand each other’s strengths and weaknesses. When teams are not co-located,
this understanding is not gained easily, causing internal struggles as demonstrated in this
team. Team interaction can make or break the outcome of a test. It is important to make
sure that a positive interaction is occurring early in the planning stages.
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FIGURES
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LH SIDE

Up

Fwd

MLG stowed, load line is measured as the line
formed from connecting the contact point of the
roller on the hook (A) through the center of the
roller (B). Over-center dimension is calculated by
taking that load line and measuring the distance
from the center of the hook latch pivot point (D).

Figure 1: MAIN LANDING GEAR UPLOCK OVER-CENTER DISTANCE
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Emergency Gear Extension Roller (3)
(Moves latch out of the way during
Emergency Gear extension)
Uplock Latch Rotation Point
Line of action of the
force from the roller on

Landing Gear Up Prox
Switch Rotation Point

(4)

Mechanical Release Arm
(Functions during normal
landing gear extension)

Spring Attachment
Point (Bushing)
Spring Attach Point

Landing Gear Up Prox Switch
Uplock Latch(2)

Uplock Clevis
Uplock Roller

UP

FWD
LH Side

Notes:
(1) This drawing shows the latch as it would be mounted to the aircraft with
the roller up, but resting on the latch and the landing gear in the locked
position.
(2) The uplock latch is always in the locked position
(3) The emergency landing gear extension manual release arm is omitted from
this drawing.
(4) As the contact point of the latch and the roller moves it will shift the line
of action relative to the rotation point of the latch. This will create either a
locking or unlocking moment.

Figure 2: MAIN LANDING GEAR UPLOCK MECHANISM
(UNINSTALLED FROM AIRCRAFT)
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Figure 3: MAIN LANDING GEAR UPLOCK LATCH MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE
(GEAR UP AND LOCKED)
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Figure 4: MAIN LANDING GEAR UPLOCK
(Technical Manual, Reference 3)
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Figure 5: MAIN LANDING GEAR AND DOORS
(Technical Manual, Reference 3)
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Figure 5: MAIN LANDING GEAR AND DOORS
(Technical Manual, Reference 3)

Figure 6: MAIN LANDING GEAR WHEEL DOOR UPLOCK ACTUATOR AND
UPLOCK (Technical Manual, Reference 3)
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Figure 7: LANDING GEAR - HYDRAULIC CIRCUIT SCHEMATIC – MLG
(NATOPS, Reference 1)
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Figure 8: LANDING GEAR – WEIGHT ON WHEELS ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC
(NATOPS, Reference 1)
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Outboard
Forward
Looking Aft

Figure 9: LEFT MLG CAMERA INSTALLATION (TOP)
AND UPLOCK VIEW FROM CAMERA (BOTTOM)
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Figure 10: LANDING GEAR SELECTOR VALVE MODIFICATION SCHEMATIC
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Figure 11: CONTROL SWITCH INSTALLATION IN FORWARD COCKPIT
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Accelerometer
Block

Uplock Clevis

Figure 12: WING ACCELEROMETER BLOCK INSTALLATION
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Accelerometer
Block

Figure 13: LANDING GEAR ACCELEROMETER INSTALLATION
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UP
FWD

INBD

LH Side

Figure 14: TARGET LINK ASSEMBLY
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% of acceleration response on the wing tip
(100% = 7.4g’s RMS)
Figure 15: T-45 WING BUFFET RESPONSE CONTOUR WITH
OVERLAY OF NZ-G
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Figure 16: T-45 MAIN LANDING GEAR INVESTIGATION
PROPOSED FLIGHT PROFILE
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VALUES
DURING
POINTPOINT
WITHWITH
SPRING
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Figure ACCELERATION
17: WING ACCELERATION
VALUES
DURING
SPRING
MOTION
(TP2-19,
FLT
1620)
(TP 2-19, FLT 1620)

59

40

7
AGXXX

6

AGYYY
AGZZZ

Acceleration (g)

5

4

3

2

1

0

-1
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Time (Sec)

18: GEAR
ACCELERATION
VALUES
DURING
POINTWITH
WITH SPRING
SPRING MOTION
FigureFigure
18: GEAR
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POINT
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Figure 19: UNDAMPED MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPLETED TEST POINTS
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Figure 20: DAMPED MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPLETED TEST POINTS
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Figure 21: FLT 1611 HYDRAULIC PRESSURE CHANGES
(Note1: Double click to play video)
(Note 2: Time stamp is incorrect on video)
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Figure 22: LOCK LINE PRESSURE DURING TEST POINT 4-6, SWITCH TOGGLED TO DISABLED POSITION
(Note: Position 1: Gear Retracted, Position 0: Gear Extended
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Figure 23: UNLOCK PRESSURE DURING TEST POINT 4-6, SWITCH TOGGLED TO DISABLED POSITION
(Note: Position 1: Gear Retracted, Position 0: Gear Extended)
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Unlock Pressure (PSI)

LG Selector Valve Position

0 .8

1.2

Landing Gear
Selector
Valve
Position
Unlock Line
Pressure

3000
2750
2500
2250

0.8

2000
1750
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1250

0.4

Unlock Pressure

Landing Gear Selctor Valve Position

1
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0.2

500
250

0
Time
(sec)

0
5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

Time (Sec)

35.0

40.0

45.0

50.0

Pressure Cycling in the
valve to regulate pressure

Figure 24: NORMAL LANDING GEAR EXTENSION UNLOCK LINE PRESSURE (TEST POINT 4-1)
(Note: Position1: Gear Extended, Position 0: Gear Extended)
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APPENDIX B:
LANDING GEAR DOOR STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
PREFORMED BY BOEING STRUCTURAL GROUP
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FIGURE 25:MAIN UNDER CARRIAGE DOORS
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Figure 26: MAIN LANDING GEAR DOOR
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Figure 27: MAIN WHEEL DOOR
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APPENDIX C:
TEST POINT MATRIX
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Test
Point

Test Point
Description

Aircraft
Config

Altitude

Table 4
TEST POINT MATRIX
Airspeed Mach Nz
Q

(ft MSL)

(KIAS)

Surface

N/A

N/A

CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR

12,250
32,000
26,500
20,250
15,250
15,800
11,750
11,000
10,000

180
230
250
275
310
300
330
345
335

0.34
0.60
0.60
0.60
0.62
0.60
0.61
0.62
0.60

CR
CR
CR

20,000
20,000
20,800

320
325
365

0.69
0.70
0.78

(psf)

Cockpit
Switch
Position

N/A

DISABLE

N/A

0.5
2.8
3.2
3.0
3.0
3.7
3.0
4.0
5.0

108
145
186
243
319
292
355
377
367

DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE

See Note 1
See Note 1
See Note 1
See Note 1
See Note 1
See Note 1
See Note 1
See Note 1

2.8
4.0
4.8

325
334
401

DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE

See Note 1
See Note 1
See Note 1

(g’s)

Switch
Comments
Duration
(seconds)

GROUND TEST
OVER-CENTER DISTANCE
1-1

Gear Swing

Document latch
engagement position
with video-camera and
scales and calculate
over-center distance

FLIGHT 1606
UNDAMPED DYNAMICS
2-1
2-3
2-4
2-5
2-6
2-7
2-8
2-9
2-10

Push Over
WUT
WUT
WUT
WUT
WUT
WUT
WUT
WUT

L Camera Light Failed
during maneuver, RTB
to replace camera light

FLIGHT 1608
UNDAMPED DYNAMICS
2-11
2-12
2-13

WUT
WUT
WUT

Combined with 2-12

Note 1: During these test points, the cockpit switch was moved from the “NORMAL” position to the “DISABLE” position below gear speed. The
aircraft then accelerated to the test condition. After the completion of each test point, the aircraft was slowed down and the switch was returned to the
“NORMAL” position to reset the gear.
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Test
Point

Test Point
Description

2-14
2-15
2-16
2-17
2-18
2-19
2-19

Table 4 Continued
Airspeed Mach Nz

Aircraft
Config

Altitude
(ft MSL)

(KIAS)

(g’s)

(psf)

WUT
WUT
WUT

CR
CR
CR

21,000
16,000
15,200

365
360
397

WUT
WUT
WUT
WUT

CR
CR
CR
CR

14,700
14,500
10,600
10,000

387
402
392
400

CR
CR
CR

10,800
10,800

WUT
WUT
WUT
WUT

CR
CR
CR
CR

31,200
25,800
21,300
16,500

230
252
275
316

0.66
0.60
0.60
0.64

WUT

CR

11,900

325

0.60

WUT
WUT
WUT

CR
CR
CR

11,600
11,000
21,150

322
335
335

0.60
0.60
0.74

Q

Cockpit
Switch
Position

Switch
Comments
Duration
(seconds)

0.80
0.72
0.78

4.9
4.0
5.0

418
417
505

DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE

See Note 1
See Note 1
See Note 1

0.75
0.78
0.70
0.71

6.2
6.6
6.9
7.8

477
520
488
514

DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE

See Note 1
See Note 1
See Note 1
See Note 1

6.0
2.8

571
602

DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE

See Note 1
See Note 1
See Note 1

182
191
232
323

NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Combined with 3-5

341

NORMAL

N/A

Combined with 3-7

345
353
356

NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL

N/A
N/A
N/A

REPEAT
Combined with 3-10

FLIGHT 1609

Combined with
maneuver 2-17

Over G to 7.8
Only have TM data/
onboard tape broken

UNDAMPED DYNAMICS
2-20
2-21
2-22

WUT
WUT
WUT

420
0.76
431
0.78
NOT COMPLETED

Attempted point twice
and got gear door light
at ~10K/ 430 KIAS

DAMPED DYNAMICS
3-1
3-2
3-3
3-4
3-5
3-6
3-7
3-8
3-8
3-9

2.4
3.0
3.1
3.0
3.7
3.0
4.0
4.5
5.2
3.2

Note 1: During these test points, the cockpit switch was moved from the “NORMAL” position to the “DISABLE” position below gear speed. The
aircraft then accelerated to the test condition. After the completion of each test point, the aircraft was slowed down and the switch was returned to the
“NORMAL” position to reset the gear.

78

Test
Point

Test Point
Description

3-10
3-11
3-11
3-13
3-14
3-15
3-16

WUT
WUT
WUT
WUT
WUT
WUT
WUT

Table 4 Continued
Airspeed Mach Nz

Aircraft
Config

Altitude
(ft MSL)

(KIAS)

CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR

20,700
21,100
19,400
15,780
16,172
15,900
16,400

316
340
356
370
377
370
390

0.70
0.75
0.76
0.74
0.76
0.73
0.78

(g’s)

(psf)

Q

Cockpit
Switch
Position

Switch
Comments
Duration
(seconds)

3.8
4.7
5.3
4.0
5.0
6.0
6.0

324
366
404
444
461
430
481

NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

REPEAT
Combined with 3-15

Worked on gear door arrangement
FLIGHT 1610
UNDAMPED DYNAMICS
2-22

WUT

CR

9,500

453

0.80

6.0

666

DISABLE

See Note 1

530
496
569
604
624

NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
DISABLE

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
See Note 1

NORMAL

N/A

DAMPED DYNAMICS
3-16
3-17
3-18
3-19
3-20a
2-23

WUT
WUT
WUT
WUT
WUT
Dive
(Undamped)

CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR

14,000
10,200
10,200
10,700
10,500
31,30014,200

410
390
416
430
438
218-468

0.78
0.70
0.75
0.78
0.79
0.94

6.5
6.5
6.5
6.0
6.5
3.4

3-21

Dive

CR

33,60013,700

218-468

0.90

3.7

(1) 30,000 ft / 0.9 M
Initiation of dive.
(2) Point Represents
the FCF profile dive.
(1) 30,000 ft/ 0.9M
Dive Initiation
(2) Point represents
the FCF profile dive.

Note 1: During these test points, the cockpit switch was moved from the “NORMAL” position to the “DISABLE” position below gear speed. The
aircraft then accelerated to the test condition. After the completion of each test point, the aircraft was slowed down and the switch was returned to the
“NORMAL” position to reset the gear.
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Test
Point

Test Point
Description

Table 4 Continued
Airspeed Mach Nz

Aircraft
Config

Altitude
(ft MSL)

(KIAS)

(g’s)

(psf)

CR to
PA
CR

4,980

180

5,030

CR

Q

Cockpit
Switch
Position

Switch
Comments
Duration
(seconds)

N/A

1

N/A

NORMAL

182

N/A

1

N/A

DISABLE

Instant

5,050

183

N/A

1

N/A

DISABLE

0.5

CR

5,040

187

N/A

1

N/A

DISABLE

1

CR

5,040

182

N/A

1

N/A

DISABLE

2

CR

4,980

182

N/A

1

N/A

Toggled
DISABLE

2

Rapid Toggling

CR

5,040

186

N/A

1

N/A

Toggled
DISABLE

2

Rapid Toggling

CR

4,940

190

N/A

1

N/A

Toggled
DISABLE

2

Rapid Toggling

FLIGHT 1611
HYDRAULIC SPIKE
4-1
4-2
4-3
4-4
4-5
4-6
4-6
4-6

Normal Gear
Extension
WOW proximity
Switch Failure
WOW proximity
Switch Failure
WOW proximity
Switch Failure
WOW proximity
Switch Failure
Intermittent
WOW Proximity
Switch
Intermittent
WOW Proximity
Switch
Intermittent
WOW Proximity
Switch

FLIGHT 1620
UNDAMPED DYNAMICS
2-1
2-3

Push Over
WUT

Replaced left uplock with old components
CR
CR

10,400
31,500

186
215

0.50
0.65

0.45
2.0

136
159

DISABLE
DISABLE

See Note 1

2g is the limit of the
aircraft.

Note 1: During these test points, the cockpit switch was moved from the “NORMAL” position to the “DISABLE” position below gear speed. The
aircraft then accelerated to the test condition. After the completion of each test point, the aircraft was slowed down and the switch was returned to the
“NORMAL” position to reset the gear.
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Test
Point

Test Point
Description

2-4
2-5
2-6
2-7
2-8
2-9
2-10
2-11
2-12
2-13/14

2-15
2-16
2-17
2-19
2-20

Table 4 Continued
Airspeed Mach Nz

Aircraft
Config

Altitude
(ft MSL)

(KIAS)

(g’s)

(psf)

WUT

CR

26,150

250

WUT
WUT

CR
CR

21,100
15,600

WUT

CR

WUT

Cockpit
Switch
Position

Switch
Comments
Duration
(seconds)

0.62

2.5

198

DISABLE

See Note 1

276
285

0.61
0.58

245
301

DISABLE
DISABLE

See Note 1
See Note 1

11,000

330

0.60

367

DISABLE

See Note 1

CR

20,250

330

0.71

334

DISABLE

See Note 1

WUT

CR

21,000

360

0.78

3.0
3.5
3.6
3.0
4.0
4.5
3.2
4.25
4.9

436

DISABLE

See Note 1

WUT
WUT

CR
CR

16,200
16,100

360
400

0.74
0.79

410
536

DISABLE
DISABLE

See Note 1
See Note 1

WUT
WUT

CR
CR

11,900
11,200

400
425

0.72
0.72

500
574

DISABLE
DISABLE

See Note 1
See Note 1

4.2
5.0
6.2
6.5
6.2

Q

2.5g is the limit of the
aircraft
Completed 2-6 and 2-7
as one maneuver
Completed 2-8, 2-9
and 2-10 as one
maneuver
Completed 2-11 and 212 as one maneuver
Experienced Pitch
Buck, Completed 2-13
and 2-14 as one
maneuver
Completed 2-16 and 217 as one maneuver

Note 1: During these test points, the cockpit switch was moved from the “NORMAL” position to the “DISABLE” position below gear speed. The
aircraft then accelerated to the test condition. After the completion of each test point, the aircraft was slowed down and the switch was returned to the
“NORMAL” position to reset the gear.
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APPENDIX D:
ENGINEERING LOG FOR T-45 UPLOCK INSTALLATION
INVESTIGATION
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17 September 2001:
COMPLETED THE FORCE CHECK ON THE OLD UPLOCKS (LOWER TIP):
L Gear Up: 5.5 lbs
L Gear Down: 6.25 lbs
R Gear Up: 5.0 lbs
R Gear Down: 7.5 lbs
Installed reworked uplocks:
Please note that neither the right or left uplock came with the 6 mm bolts installed
The uplocks were held together with plastic ties
Measured values with new uplocks installed (lower tip):
L Gear Down: 7.5 lbs (One of the springs was somewhat distorted)
R Gear down: 10 lbs

18 September 2001:
Removed the right uplock to see if the uplock latch would move under its own weight:
IT DID NOT
Loosened the 6 mm bolt and the latch moved under its own weight
Re-tightened the bolt to hand tightness and the latch did not move under its own weight
Also verified that the bushing was brown in color vice the reddish color one on the old
uplock
Completed a spring check on all of the 8 springs that we had here at Pax:
(Displaced one inch and measured the force using force gauge and measured
displacement)
1- 6.25 lbs
4- 6.50 lbs
2- 6.75 lbs
1- 7.00 lbs
- The one spring that was somewhat distorted measured 6.75 lbs when an attempt was
made to correct the spring, the force lessened by 1/8 lbs
- Replaced the springs on the left uplock with two springs that measured 6.5 lbs and the
total friction force measured was 7.25 lbs (WE NEED TO ORDER NEW SPRINGS)
Took apart the re-worked R uplock and there were 3 shims that measured .012 in.
Removed and replaced with 2 shims that measure .014in. and torqued to 40-60 in-lbs and
now the latch moves under its own weight. Measured .002in. freeplay with feeler gauge.
Were asked to remove the left uplock to verify how many shims were installed
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There were 3 shims that measured .011in. and a new brownish color bushing were
installed
The left uplock was rebuilt and the freeplay checked, there was NO freeplay measured
with feeler gauge.

19 Sept 01:
Installed an additional shim to create a .0135in. with .002in. lateral freeplay in the
system measured with a feeler gauge
Reinstalled the right and left re-worked uplocks
Replaced Springs with new springs
Take friction measurements : Gear Down (lower tip): 7.25 lbs on both sides

20 Sept 01:
Waiting on Springs
Completed Installation of Photogrammetric targets

21 Sept 01:
Prepared for gear swings with instrumentation
Re-checked friction inspection documentation, realized that the measurements were taken
at the wrong tip location, re-took friction measurements: Gear Down (upper tip): 10 lbs
R, 11 lbs L
Confirmed that when the springs were removed that the latch fell under its own weight
Confirmed that the uplocks were not hard to install and that the external shims were used

24 Sept 01:
Checked spring force of the 4 new springs (using force gauge and measured distance)
1- 6.25 lbs
2- 6.25 lbs
3- 6.25 lbs
4- 6.50 lbs

25 Sept 01:
Checked what spring gauge we used: 25 lbs Chatilion Gauge certified Aug 21 2001, does
not need to be certified again until Aug 20 2003.
Verified that the measurement was taken horizontal to the installation bolt line
Gear Down: L: 11
R: 10.25
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The springs were uninstalled, we verified that both of the target links moved freely
Also checked to see the force required to move just the hook and target link with the
force gauge applied flat to the lower tip surface as shown below: 1 lb initial breakout
force on both sides

UP
FWD
Reinstalled the springs
L: 6.25 lbs and 6.50 lbs spring
R: 6.25 lbs and 6.25 lbs spring
Changed the tip of the force gauge to a V-tip so that we could use the tip to use the tip to
guide along the tip of the latch. (Used 6-inch extension). When measured forces, the
gauge was up against the emergency door release cable.
The L Force was 9.0 lbs (measured 3 times using upper tip)
The R Force was 10.0 lbs (measured 3 times using upper tip)
Measured the displacement of the springs installed in the aircraft (0.5 inch) then
measured the force to displace that distance. (We measured 4 springs at 0.5 inch
displacement and measured 4.5 lbs- 3 times and 4.25 lbs once)
Verified that the uplock actuator was retracted on both sides of the mechanism
Verified that the emergency landing gear handle was completely stowed
Measured force to move the latch from A053 with the springs disconnected: 2.25 lbs
Measured the force to move the hooks with the springs attached: 8.25 lbs
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26 Sept 01: (Ambient Temperature About 75°F)
(Rick Rogers from DEPOT for onsite support):
Re-took measurements:
L/ Gear Down/ Upper Tip: (Bob) 9/9.25/9.25
(Rick): 9.25/ 9.00
R/ Gear Down/ Upper Tip: (Bob and Rick) > 10 lbs
Removed Left Uplock from Aircraft and re-measured components:
External Shim: .02in.
Internal Shim ~.016in.
- There was some minor wear on the Teflon bushing faces: (Can see the evidence of hook
rotation)
-Able to rock the prox switch target when applying forces at tip. Less than .002 play at
pivot point
-Upper Pin measured per AFC266
Spring Free Measures : (1) 3.165
(2) 3.160
Rebuilt the uplock using the same shims
Freely falls
Installed Re-worked Left uplock in model fixture for A053 uplock
Measured the force in the fixture: (Bob) 8.2 lbs
(Rick): 7.5 lbs
Took force measurements with one spring connected: 4 lbs with either spring
Tried to measure the shim without tearing apart component: Estimated .018in.

27 Sept 01: (Ambient Temperature at Start about 50°F)
Reinstalled old A053 uplock into model fixture and took measurements:
7.5 lbs/ 7.75 lbs/ 7.75 (Horizontal) (Note: this is .5-.75 lbs less than measured Tuesday)
Changed to along load line (30°) and measured 6.5/ 6.5/ 6.25 lbs
Unable to get a .0015in. feeler gauge in component
Reinstalled new left uplock back into model: Measured 7.75/ 7.75/ 7.75 lbs
Recompleted spring measurements on the two springs from A037 Left uplock and A053
right uplock at 0.5in. and 1in. increments the spring measurements were:
New: 4.25/ 6.5 lbs(0.5in./ 1in.)
New: 4.35/ 6.5 lbs
Old: 4.25/ 6.5 lbs
Old: 4.0/ 6.0 lbs
Re-checked shims from L uplock = .005in.
Removed the .002in. shim from A037 L Uplock, reshimmed to .013in. rechecked with
feeler gauge .002in. freeplay.
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-Can notice some wobble in the assembly when the hook point is moved laterally
(Appears to wobble in the bushings)
Measure hook point pin diameter and corresponding bushing ID’s
Side Plate: 0.472in.
Guide Plate: 0.472in.
Side Plate Hook Pin: 0.470in.
Guide Plate Hook Pin: 0.470in.
Reassembled L A037 uplock and reinstalled in Aircraft
It is a contact fit, but was done by hand
Upper Pin measures .39in. in diameter
Spacer diameter measures: 0.375in./ 0.380in.
Re-Checked forces:
L /Gear Down/ Upper Tip: 8.25/8.75/ 8.75 lbs
R/ Gear Down/ Upper Pin: 8.75/ 8.75 lbs
Measured Simulated Gear Up (Having problem with tool installation technique)
L ~ 6 lbs
R~ 6.75-7.25 lbs
Installed a heat lamp on L Uplock to see if temp would change values:
Baseline: 71°F 8.25/ 8.75/ 8.75 lbs
At 122° F there was no noticeable change in the force or freeplay (measured installed in
a/c)
R Uplock Gear Down 8.75/ 8.75 lbs
Freeplay: 0.003in.
Gear Up: 6.75/ 7.25 lbs
Removed R A037 uplock from aircraft
Disassembled Values:
.015in. Internal Shim
.030in. External Shim
Guide Plate Bushing: 0.472in.
Side Plate Bushing: 0.472in.
Hook Pins (Both): 0.470in.
Spring Checks:
4.0/ 6.0 lbs (0.5in./ 1.0in.)
4.5/ 6.5 lbs
Installed A053 Uplock into aircraft:
Gear Down Check: 9.0 lbs
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Sim Gear Up Check: 7.0 lbs
Free Play: < .0015in.
Target Link rubbing hard on the uplock beam outboard edge: Has large diameter pins and
spacers installed
Measured Diameters of Gear Up Tool: Small Diameter Section Measured : 0.745in.
should measure 0.78/0.80 lbs
Added tape to increase diameter to 0.775in.
Reinstalled tool into uplock assembly and applied slight load on tool and measurements
on A053 R uplock were < 5lbs
L Gear Up (as measured on A053): 5.75/ 6/ 5.25/ 5.0 lbs (Horizontal)
L Gear Down: 7.5/ 8.25/ 8.0/ 8.0 lbs (Horizontal)
Reinstalled Re-worked R uplock
Gear Down: 8.75/ 8.5/ 8.5 lbs (Taken Horizontal)
Gear Down: 9.0/ 9.0 lbs (Aligned ~30° along load line)
Gear Up: 7.5/ 6.0/ 6.0/ 6.0 lbs (Horizontal)
Disassembled A053 uplock:
1 shim = 0.02in.
Bushing de-laminated from sideplate
Disassembled target link assembly:
Teflon Face Bearing
Need to check print for pin installation

1 Oct 01:
Took R uplock apart and took target link off
- Noticed corrosion on the shim (split into two pieces)
- Possible corrosion on the bearing assembly
Ordered replacement shim and rivets to put component back together

3 Oct 01:
Rebuilt R uplock and reinstall into the aircraft
Prepare for gear swings and video swings
Installation R uplock Gear Down: 7/9/7.25 lbs
Gear Up: 7/7/7 lbs
Completed Gear Swings (4 Oct 01)
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